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BOOK REVIEWS
the whims and caprices of them all, into effectuating the agreed-upon
policy is another matter. The efforts to maintain some degree of stability
during the reconversion period after World War II, for example, simply
fell apart under the fierce and almost hysterical pressure of internecine
economic warfare. The result was not only to belie every prediction
made by those responsible for premature dismantling of the control mA-
chinery, particularly as to the stability of the price level and the volume
of production; but, as Professor Hart is so acutely aware, to make the
task of our present administrators infinitely more difficult. ,
Here is a field of study almost unexplored, and one which should
commend itself to the splendid public spirit of the Twentieth Century
Fund. Not merely in fighting inflation but in the effectuation of all
economic policies, the rock upon which democratic government seems
most likely to flounder is the rock of divisive pressure politics. How can
we keep government responsive to the demands of popular opinion 'and
at the same time make it possible for public servants to legislate and
administer in an unbadgered and rational atmosphere? Such a challenge
offers the Fund opportunity for an effort worthy to rank with the study
which Professor Hart and his associates have completed with such
distinction.
PAUL A. PORTER.A
JURISPRUDENCE: ITS AMERICAN PROPHETS. By Harold Gill
Reuschlein.* Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1951. Pp.
xvii, 527. $7.50.
With the appearance of this book, a much needed tool of juris-
prudential instruction has at long last been supplied. Here, all the
divergent views so well known among legal scholars are brought together
in such a way as to emphasize the most favorable points of each. This
method of presentation, it will be noted, differs radically from the prac-
tices of most of those about whom Professor Reuschlein is writing.
Many jurists, in emphasizing their own contributions, all too often de-
emphasize thie virtues and stress the defects of competing philosophies.
Despite the favorable treatment here accorded by the author, the clashes
are obvious for one to find; but the juristic fights are not held out on the
stage with the author finding personal zest in the conflicts.
The subtitle of the book fairly describes its actual content. So
comprehensive is the coverage that the views of both the third and fourth-
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raters are concisely and sympathetically presented, along with those of
their stronger brethren. Most are contemporaries who are writing and
teaching now or have done so-within the consciousness of men now living.
In view of the scope of the work, it is therefore surprising to find such
men as Petrazhiski and Dabin left out. Surely Petrazhiski is one of the
greatest of modern legal philosophers and should be in any book that
deals, as this one does, with men like Stammler, Ihring, Duguit, Kelsen
and Pound. Petrazhiski and Dabin are special favorites of mine, per-
haps in part because they do not follow the natural law technique,
although they are devout adherents to the canon law discipline and are
profoundly learned in the scholastic approach to natural law.
Reuschlein gives a good deal of attention to the Neo-Scholastic
views of natural law and to natural law generally. For instance,
he gives a most illuminating account of natural law among the English
Puritans who settled New England and who equated natural law with
the law of God, with the general understanding that the law of God was
found in the Bible. Perhaps as in the case of sciolastic natural law,
Reuschlein does not point out that these respective views of natural law
were indigenous to the moral and religious thinking of almost everyone
in the community when they were dominantly asserted. At, the present
time things are quite different in this country. We have many religions
in the United States and there are many sects within the several religions.
Furthermore, there are many divisions in the philosophic thought of a
large number of our citizens who are not official adherents of any re-
ligious dogmas or organizations. We emphasize democracy and toler-
ance, assuming that all of us can meet together happily in our efforts
to solve legal problems, while each receives spiritual strength and com-
fort from his particular moral or religious views.
Might it not be fortunate to drop natural law and natural rights
entirely from purely legal discussion of a general nature, leaving them
as Dabin and Petrazhiski do, in the realm of their own deep moral and
religious thought; making them, if you like, a part of ethics or culture
in a general sense, but not a part of the general law in any direct sense?
For instance, if, in order to discuss a plain question of moral values in
a particular legal problem, we take the Puritan view that natural law is
the law of God as found in the Bible we immediately must discuss the
many quarrelsome interpretations of the Bible, with the danger of most
unhappy animosities on religious issues. To somewhat less degree perhaps
there is the same danger in the scholastic approach which asserts quite
definitely that it is not an ideal system of law only but also an objective
fact. Of course, there is the ideal element in the scholastic view, but
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quite definitely it is also a particular pattern which in turn is immutable.
For instance, their five official divisions into which natural law is divided
substantially are: (1) God's relation to man; (2) Man's relation to
himself; (3) Man's relation to the family; (4) Man's relation to other
men; (5) The common Good. These are most practical and admirable
choices, but in each case they do presuppose religious issues, since in
sober fact all of our citizens do not agree on the nature of God nor the
nature of man, while the scholastic teaching on this side of natural law
is very definitely emphasized and contains their precise doctrines.
Among present jurists, there seems to be a division between those
who adhere to natural law in some form and those who do not. F6r
instance, one often thinks of Jefferson's frequent reference to "the law
of nature" and sometimes "the law of nature and nature's God," not as
an assertion of personal religious belief and certainly not an intentional
assertion of pantheism, somewhat in the manner of Spinoza, but rather
given by way of general moral emphasis to indicate his fervent belief
in those concepts of liberty and equality to which he gives expression.
But this too is called natural law, and Professor Reuschlein treats it
in the most sympathetic and laudatory way. But the three instances we
have given (and there are many more) may serve to indicate how widely
different is the content that may be found in the common phrase "natural
law." When used alone, that general expression" may in fact represent
almost contradictory views. It simply is not a common meeting ground
for lawyers, and there is grave danger in its producing unhappy results.
Rather than differ over the character of natural law, especially in a
country where there is no general support for any single interpretation
of this concept, might it not be better to drop the controversial thing
entirely? Why not talk about ethics, culture, and psychology directly
and frankly for their own sake, rather than court needless difficulties by
trying to fit them into the concept of natural law upon which lawyers do
not agree? The grave danger that we will end in discussing the tech-
nical dogmas of different systems of natural law while we fail entirely
to use ethical and cultural and other values in the worthy solution of
our legal problems seems a sufficient reason to seek another approach. I
hesitate to suggest any substitute term that will meet this difficulty.
Perhaps if we abandon natural law, our general effort to find moral
values will bring about a reasonable agreement on new terms. And
surely what we need is not necessarily some literal definition, but suffi-
cient agreement to do the job of making ethical standards count in the
actual work of the law.
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As a purely tentative suggestion, could we not talk about "value
judgments ?" They compare conveniently with law judgments or indeed
with court decisions, or the total content of the law in a general sense.
For my part, I quite agree that moral values are more than "criticized
experience" or other pragmatic concepts, no matter how expertly these
concepts are developed. But I submit that value judgments are made
in the active sense by human beings and that the whole of the human
conscience, understanding, and will (along with consciousness and other
elements which may be included) are used in piroducing these value judg-
ments. On conscience, then, we .can all stand, in giving every element
of the Good to the law that is so dear to us, while each retains for himself
the sources of spiritual strength which he derives from his own personal
allegiances.
PAUL SAYRE.t
SEX AND THE LAW. By Morris Ploscowe.* New York: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1951. Pp. ix, 310. $3.95.
Sex and the Law is a comprehensive, well-organized examination
and analysis of the case and statutory law, both civil and criminal,
regulating sexual activity in the United States at the present time.
Judge Ploscowe's" approach to such a diversified and far-reaching
subject is ideal, for he not only compares and discusses .state by state
the various laws, pointing out the defects, inconsistencies, and problems
caused by their differences, but also makes an internal analysis of the
laws within various states. In consequence, the full effect of society's
attempt, through law, to regulate sexual behavior is exposed.
Nowhere is the sex law more incongruous and lacking in reality
than in the regulation of marriage. For example, every jurisdiction has,
either by statute or by common law, established an age of consent for
marriag-that is, the age at which a boy or girl may enter into a legally
binding marriage. At the English common law, the age of consent was
fourteen for the boy and twelve for the girl. The age most frequently
found throughout the United States at the present, however, is eighteen
years for males and sixteen years for females. In no instance has a
legislature set the age at twenty-one, which is the usual age of consent in
the case of ordinary contracts. The anomaly exists, therefore, that while
a boy or girl under twenty-one years is not bound by an agreement to
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